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ABSTRACT
This paper applies Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework to explain how a 
local dog park – the Montrose – is able to overcome communal degradation in the absence of a central-
ized power. In the first half of this piece, I elucidate the rules, participants, and systems that character-
ize this specific social-ecological system. In the second half, through a combination of park-goer inter-
views and analyses of online reviews, I find that the existence of high degrees of social capital between 
participants, repeated interactions, entwined utilities, and the institutional diversity of a polycentric sys-
tem serve to explain the effective maintenance, monitoring, and self-governance systems at the Montrose.
Canines and Commons: An Institutional Analysis
By Andy Xie1
1Yale University
SECTION I: BIG QUESTIONS
To be an off-leash dog owner in the late 20th century was a frustrat-
ing condition. With the lack of open-spaces and the proliferation 
of leash laws across the United States, many pet owners became 
increasingly agitated at what they viewed to be state-sponsored re-
strictions on their otherwise unfettered right to roam. Thus, when 
the city of Berkeley, California reserved a plot of open land for the 
creation of an underground subway line, the air was ripe for rebel-
lion: activists occupied the area and urged the local government to 
quash the subway project and instead sanction the land as a public 
space for off-leash canine enterprises (Krohe, 2005). The result was 
the creation of the Ohlone Dog Park in 1979 – the world’s first pub-
lic commons for dogs and their owners. Around two decades later, 
in the summer of 2000, a group of individuals living in Chicago, 
Illinois took the pursuits of the Ohlone activists one step further: 
motivated by a love for long walks on the shore, they founded the 
Montrose – Chicago’s first off-leash dog beach.
Nestled along the Eastern coast of Chicago, Illinois, the Montrose 
Dog Beach is one of the most acclaimed dog “parks” in America. 
With hundreds of near-perfect ratings on Yelp, the beach serves as 
a paradigm for collective, public canine recreation. But how – and 
under what conditions – is Montrose able to overcome the “tragedy 
of the commons” in the absence of the market’s “invisible-hand” 
or the sanctioning power of a centralized state? Why do individual 
participants in this social-ecological system (SES) undertake costly 
measures (such as obtaining the requisite shots for or cleaning up 
after their pets), when they bear the brunt of the costs associat-
ed with such activities, with the resulting benefits being diffused 
throughout the entire community? How, specifically, are positive 
outcomes – i.e., effective maintenance, monitoring, and self-gover-
nance – pre-figured in the overarching design principles of the SES 
at Montrose?
SECTION II: A USEFUL FRAMEWORK
The framework for institutional analysis that Elinor Ostrom devel-
oped in her seminal book Understanding Institutional Diversity 
deconstructs these questions piecemeal. Complex systems, Ostrom 
posits, can be distilled systematically and universally into sever-
al fundamental building blocks: exogenous variables, action situ-
ations, action arenas, interactions, and outcomes (Ostrom, 2009). 
These exogenous factors – i.e. rules, biophysical conditions, and 
community attributes – structure the patterns of interaction in an 
action arena, which in turn produce outcomes evaluated along vari-
ous criteria (Ostrom, 2009). An undesired outcome may then circle 
back to affect the strategies, conditions, or rules governing the sys-
tem (Ostrom, 2009). 
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Figure 2 visualizes Ostrom’s framework as mapped onto the SES at 
Montrose. In this specific scenario, the action situation comprises 
two main systems: natural and management. The natural system is 
the “park,” which provides the resources, boundaries, amenities, 
and landscape in which the participants operate. The management 
system encompasses the norms, rules-in-use, upkeep strategies, and 
monitoring techniques that govern the park. In this sense, the natu-
ral and management systems, taken together, represent the invari-
ant backdrop of the SES at Montrose. On the other hand, the action 
arena – which consists of the action situation plus an additional 
social element – is constantly in flux: no two days at the beach are 
precisely the same. In other words, when participants enter the ac-
tion arena, Montrose transforms from a passive beach to a dynamic 
system.
As such, throughout this SES, Ostrom’s universal building blocks 
– exogenous variables, action arenas, and outcomes – are salient 
and useful for distilling this complex system into highly digestible 
pixels that can be outlined, rearranged, and repackaged into novel 
theories of human behavior – a process that begins with a meticu-
lous analysis of rules.
SECTION III: THE RULES OF THE GAME
Rules, Ostrom states, are “shared understandings by participants 
about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) 
are required, prohibited, or permitted” (Ostrom, 2005). In other 
words, rules influence, constrain, and regulate the elements of an 
action arena, as outlined in the following schematic (Ostrom, 2005):
Figure 4 details the rules as they apply to the SES at Montrose 
(MonDog, n.d.). In this case, the position rules are not stated ex-
plicitly, but they are implied through the various other guidelines. 
For instance, rule #2 – that owners are responsible for the moni-
toring and safety of their dogs – establishes dogs and their owners 
as two key participants in this system. Rule #4 introduces a third 
participant into the arena: the Chicago police officer. Rule #8 – 
which introduces both the Park District and Park Advisory Council 
MonDog, comprising local volunteers – further formulates a fourth 
and fifth participant in the SES. Rules 13 and 15 indicate that age 
is an important factor in determining the nature of participants at 
Montrose, codifying the child (i.e. a human under 12 years of age) 
and puppy (a dog under four months of age) as a sixth and seventh 
participant in the system. 
How, though, do individuals become valid participants in this 
space? Rules 7 and 11 maintain that only dogs with a DFA (Dog 
Friendly Area) tag – the possession of which signals   good health 
and proper vaccinations – are permitted within the beach; though 
there is no fee to enter the beach itself, the tag costs $10. Rule #10 
further qualifies this stipulation: a tag without its accompanying 
paperwork, issued at the time of application, is insufficient. Rules 
6 and 7 continue in this vein: dogs must be immunized, vaccinated, 
and dewormed before entering the beach. The issue of health, it 
seems, is paramount at Montrose. 
Figure 3. A classification of the various types of rules affecting an action 
arena, sourced from Understanding Institutional Diversity (Ostrom 
2005). Boundary rules specify how individuals become valid participants 
in the SES, position rules delimit the various roles participants occupy, 
choice rules outline the actions that a participant may undertake, aggre-
gation rules clarify who has the authority to craft rules in the first place, 
information rules affect how and what information is disseminated, payoff 
rules assign costs and benefits to participants, and scope rules delimit 
how actions lead to outcomes. 
YURJ | Vol 2.1 Spring 20212
Figure 2.  A visualization of the SES at Montrose.
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Once participants successfully enter the beach, their actions are 
constrained by several choice rules. For one, rule #2 holds that 
owners must always have their dogs in eyesight to ensure their and 
others’ safety; watching from outside the fence or dropping a dog 
off unaccompanied is not permitted. Moreover, rule #4 states that 
owners have the authority – and more than that, the obligation – to 
clean up after their dogs “every time, no matter where, no matter 
when;” it also gives on-duty Chicago police officers the ability to 
levy fines up to $500 on owners who fail to do so (in accordance 
with City of Chicago Ordinance 7-12-420). Rule #8 – which in-
troduces the volunteer Park Advisory Council MonDog (the Mon-
trose Dog Owners Group) – further establishes that MonDog has 
the authority to oversee the maintenance (i.e. cleanliness) of the 
park, inform newcomers of the rules, and resolve internal conflicts, 
alerting authorities when necessary; in turn, the Chicago Park Dis-
trict manages the more cumbersome maintenance activities, such 
as sanitizing the beach with a “beach Zamboni,” reallocating sand, 
and emptying waste containers. Rule #13 holds that adults have full 
jurisdiction over their children in the beach area.
The above choice rules, though upheld by MonDog’s monitoring 
mechanisms, are further fortified by external rewards (payoffs) and 
sanctions (costs) associated with compliance and defection, respec-
tively. For instance, rule #4 establishes a monetary fine on owners 
who fail to clean up after their dogs, and rule #1 emphasizes liabil-
ity (both monetary and legal) for injuries inflicted upon other dogs. 
However, the costs of defection are not merely monetary, with rule 
#1 implying that the failure to properly adhere to park regulations 
may also result in physical risks to both parties. Thus, a key payoff 
of compliance is the enjoyment of a safer, friendlier environment. 
Moreover, rule #14 implies that caring for more than 3 dogs at once 
would be stressful and unmanageable for a single owner, thereby 
establishing the cons of defection and the pros of compliance from 
the lens of owner experience and morale, as well.
SECTION IV: THE MONTROSE AND THE MUTT
The existence of rules would be meaningless in the absence of a 
space upon which the rules apply. Thus, the story of Montrose now 
turns to Uptown, Chicago (US – Illinois) on the northeast end of 
the city. Located along the southern end of Lake Michigan, the 
beach is large (around 0.7 miles long and 0.3 miles wide) and en-
tirely fenced in on two sides, with the water serving as the third 
border. Depending on the level of the lake (Montrose receives all 
four seasons and a moderate amount of rain throughout the year), 
there may be a small gap between the end of the fence and the wa-
ter-front – a physical inevitability that reinforces the importance of 
owners maintaining constant vigilance over their pets. The water is 
shallow, which makes it conducive for wading (and doggy paddle). 
The beach itself (Point 1 on Figure 5) consists of sand, which the 
Chicago Park District regularly sweeps with the “beach Zamboni,” 
a machine that sifts through and removes particulates and other re-
fuse (MonDog, n.d).
As indicated by Point 2, there is a single, double-gated entrance to 
the beach. A few hundred feet beyond, owners may enter the Mutt 
Jackson cleaning facility through Point 3 (at the time this photo was 
taken, the facility had not yet been constructed). Next to the Mutt 
Jackson is a small parking lot (Point 4) and a grassy area (Point 5), 
where people can escape the beach for a leisurely stroll. With these 
3YURJ | Vol 2.1Spring 2021
Figure 4. The rules of Montrose, sourced from their official website.
Figure 5. A bird’s-eye view of Montrose, as captured by Google Satellite. Figure 6. A more level view of Montrose, as taken from Yelp.
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sentiments in mind, the key questions shift from the “what” and the 
“where” to the “why” and the “how” – the subjects of the second 
half of this analysis.
SECTION V: THE ENTWINEMENT THEORY
Old Ideas
In 1836, John Stuart Mill – a British political economist – penned 
“On the Definition of Political Economy and the Method of Investi-
gation Proper to it,” a seminal work which introduced the idea of an 
“economic man.” The theory of Homo Economicus, as it came to 
be known, characterized an individual’s behavior as “rational” only 
if it advanced their own self-interest and accumulation of wealth, 
luxury, and leisure (Mill, 1836). Under this view, it is assumed that 
participants within an SES will as follows: 
Utility1 = Benefits1 * [Compliance] – Costs1 * [Compliance]
. . . where [Compliance] is a dummy variable that equals 1 if partic-
ipants comply with existing rules, “Benefits1” is a variable describ-
ing the utility a participant derives from complying with existing 
rules, and “Costs1” is a variable describing the costs a participant 
faces when complying with existing rules; in this case, Costs1 > 
Benefits1. In other words, when a rational being is assumed to “max-
imize his gain,” given that the benefits of complying are dispersed 
amongst all participants within a system while the associated costs 
flow directly to that individual, Hardin predicts that “freedom . . . 
will bring ruin to all” (Hardin, 1968).
In contrast, participants within the SES at Montrose do not appear 
to behave in a manner that comports with Mill and Hardin’s ideas 
of self-regarding economic preferences, whereby individuals pos-
sess incentives to free-ride on the contributions of other participants 
within the system. For one, members of MonDog – Montrose’s 
park advisory council – volunteer their time to oversee, maintain, 
and clean the beach (on a daily basis); remind participants of park 
etiquette; resolve conflicts within the SES; correspond with the 
broader Chicago Park District; coordinate community events; orga-
nize fundraisers; and attend 6 board meetings per year. In fact, there 
even exists a suggested donation of $50 to become a “member” of 
MonDog and support its day-to-day operating expenses. Thus, this 
tranche of participants at Montrose receives no monetary compen-
sation for their services and may even lose money in the process 
– a far cry from the actions expected under traditional theories of 
individual behavior, which posit that the direct input costs of vol-
unteering outweigh the dispersed benefits volunteers receive from 
a clean, functioning park and given that dues-paying volunteers 
maintain the option to enjoy recreation for their dogs at no charge 
as standard park frequenters.
Moreover, a review written on August 10, 2019 highlights the altru-
istic nature of owners as participants within this SES, with Robert 
M. stating that his dog jumped the fence surrounding the park only 
to be stopped a half mile down the beach by a fellow participant 
(Yelp, 2019). At Montrose, participants are eager to take actions on 
behalf of other parties that accord no immediate benefit to them-
selves – another feature of this system that falls outside traditional 
theories of collective behavior.
 
A New Theory
On June 25, 2019, Kayla M. took to Yelp to emphatically declare that 
“we LOVE this beach” (Yelp, 2019). On February 16, 2018, Sum-
mer R. incredulously expressed that she “can’t believe something 
like a dog beach exists, but we are so glad it does” (Yelp, 2018). On 
August 7, 2014, Marjorie F. stated approvingly that “Maggie and 
I come here as often as we can weather-permitting” (Yelp, 2014). 
The illuminative pattern across these narratives, one that clarifies 
the collective and ostensibly altruistic nature of the interactions the 
occur within this system, is the consistent use of the pronoun “we.” 
In this sense, the SES at Montrose demands a nuanced interpreta-
tion of Ostrom’s framework: though traditionally treated as distinct 
entities with their own unique set of incentives and aims, partici-
pants in this system – namely, dogs and owners – appear to view 
themselves as conclusively entwined. In other words, participants 
at Montrose tend to describe their affairs and values in terms that 
connote shared, rather than discrete, experiences.
 
To explain this phenomenon in theoretical terms, dogs and own-
ers in this SES are said to possess a large degree of “bridging so-
cial capital:” the trust, cohesion, connectedness, and bonds that 
tie together separate groups of individuals (or participants) (Pret-
ty, 2003). In this vein, the theoretical literature is rife; in his piece 
“Are Dogs Children, Companions, or Just Animals?” David Blouin 
finds that “pet owners often think of their dogs as either their chil-
dren or close friends,” and in “Why Do People Love Their Pets,” 
John Archer traces these parental tendencies to certain evolutionary 
traits that have rendered dogs particularly well-suited to manipu-
lating human responses (Blouin, 2013; Archer, 1997). Thus, just as 
parents willingly accept the exorbitant costs of child-rearing, many 
dog-owners are similarly inclined to undertake costly activities for 
the benefit of their pets. With this dynamic in mind, the story of 
Montrose becomes one of patronage, which alters the aforemen-
tioned utility equation in the following ways . . . 
Utility2 = (Benefits1 + E2) * [Compliance] – Costs1 * [Compliance]
. . . where the additional factor E2, which I term the “entwinement 
factor,” accounts for the fact that the interests of owners and dogs 
within this SES are entwined, with the presence of a happy dog 
granting an owner with an additional unit of utility: the interests of 
the pet are themselves in the interest of the focal individual. Under 
this condition, an individual will comply with the system’s rules if 
(Benefits1 + E2) > Costs1. As stated above, one key determinant of 
the factor E2 is the high degree of bridging social capital between 
dogs and their owners – a phenomenon that explains owners’ incli-
nations to purchase DFA tags, schedule veterinary appointments, 
YURJ | Vol 2.1 Spring 20214
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and maintain constant vigilance over their pets whilst within the 
confines of the beach.
A second variable that flows into E2 stems less from the standpoint 
of patronage and more from one of self-interested gratification. In 
an interview via email on November 11, 2019, Shelly Burke – the 
social media chair of the MonDog Advisory Council – had this to 
say about why she joined the volunteer organization a little over 
nine years ago: “I enjoy being able to photograph the pups (not in 
a professional capacity) and sharing them on social media.” Speak-
ing about a fellow board member, Burke said “recently, another . . . 
has helped because they are there all the time with their nine-year-
old black lab/Anatolian Shepherd mix, Sadie.” Burke’s comments 
illuminate one particular channel through which the SES at Mon-
trose manages to solve the second-order collective action problem 
– that is, the threat of free-riding in the creation and maintenance 
of the sanctioning system, which itself is a public good (Oliver, 
1980). Though Burke and her colleague gain little in the way of 
monetary or temporal value from their involvement with MonDog, 
they participate anyways by virtue of the sheer joy they receive 
from seeing, taking pictures of, and spending time with dogs (both 
their own and those of others). 
A third variable that impacts the entwinement factor (E2) is the oc-
currence of repeated interactions, which tends to deter behavior that 
falls outside of Montrose’s established norms. As Karla A. noted in 
her July 14, 2016 review of the beach, “if you go often, you’ll get 
to know the ‘regulars.’ Avoid peak hours if you don’t want to deal 
with the few careless owners who hang out with friends, tan, etc. 
and forget to watch their dogs” (Yelp, 2016). Moreover, when Jas-
min T. was a “little bit nervous because of my rambunctious pup,” 
she “made friends with some people there and they convinced us 
that it was safe” (Yelp, 2015). Jennifer G. expresses a similar ac-
count of solidarity within the SES: “the one time I saw an aggres-
sive dog there, people joined together and politely informed the 
owner that the dog needed to leave” (Yelp, 2015). Thus, it appears 
that the presence of repeated interactions within Montrose culti-
vates a strong sense of amicability, unity, and community amongst 
participants (namely owners), thereby driving owners to sustain the 
sanctioning and mutual monitoring practices of the system.
SECTION VI: DOGGED MONITORING AND A POLYCENTRIC 
SYSTEM 
Polycentricity – as defined in Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout, 
and Robert Warren’s “The Organization of Government in Metro-
politan Areas” – is the idea that the amalgamation of autonomous 
yet interdependent decision-making entities within an SES, though 
complex, need not devolve into chaos (Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 
1961). This principle certainly holds within the context of Mon-
trose, where the many layers of diversity (both individual and in-
stitutional) serve to constrain, alter, and shape behavior within the 
SES in such a way as to maintain its effective maintenance, moni-
toring, and governance. Figure 7 illustrates the nature of polycen-
tricity as it applies to Montrose.
The first tranche of self-imposed administration exists between 
dogs themselves. As illustrated through various accounts, large 
dogs frequently “play rough” and “work out their energies with 
each other” (Yelp, 2018). One woman went as far as to say that 
her Chihuahua Peanut, as a result of his participation at Montrose, 
“has slowly become more sociable and has even been able to walk 
with me along the beach without being rude to other dogs . . . [be-
coming] more gentlemanly in his mannerisms and able to respect 
the other dogs around him” (Yelp, 2017). Thus, at Montrose, dogs 
sanction other dogs that they perceive to be acting in an unruly and 
agitating manner. In this way, Montrose benefits from dogs’ evolu-
tionary instincts for socialization and self-preservation.
A second level of authority within this system exists at the anthro-
pomorphic scale, with owners monitoring the behavior of both their 
dogs and that of other owners. As illustrated above (i.e. in section 
IV), owners’ utility functions are linked with the well-being of their 
pets, which creates an incentive to “keep an eye on your dog” lest 
“lose him/her very fast” (Yelp, 2019). As a result, when disputes 
between dogs fail to resolve themselves peacefully, there remains 
an additional layer of human intervention to maintain order in the 
beach. The following statement from Rosalie C. – that in her “3 
years of going there [Montrose], I know there is one dog my dog 
does not get along with and I just leave the park” – sheds light upon 
additional strategies that owners have developed over time to effec-
5YURJ | Vol 2.1Spring 2021
Figure 7.  A visualization of polycentricity at Montrose.
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tively pre-empt tumultuous dog-on-dog scuffles and a subsequent 
disintegration of order within the SES (Yelp, 2016). In this vein, the 
anecdotes of solidarity expressed in Karla, Jasmin, and Jennifer’s 
reviews (as depicted in section VI) illustrate the catalyzing effect 
of repeated interactions on mutual monitoring practices between 
owners themselves: those who fail to keep close watch on their pets 
are collectively and publicly confronted.
On a more institutional level, the MonDog Advisory Council and 
the Chicago Park District serve as two key players that preside over 
owners and their dogs. Of the two, MonDog interacts more direct-
ly with participants, spearheading beach cleanups, disseminating 
information regarding beach etiquette, providing waste bags, and 
organizing events to bolster community relations (MonDog, n.d.). 
In this sense, MonDog acts as the outward facing representative 
of Montrose, establishing a sense of external governance above 
and beyond the dogs and owners themselves. In contrast, the Park 
District operates as more of a behind-the-scenes, logistical body 
– collecting waste containers, reallocating sand, and operating the 
“beach Zamboni” (MonDog, n.d.). With the vast majority of its 
funds stemming from fundraisers and donations, MonDog alone 
would not be able to absorb the expenses associated with the larger 
maintenance activities of the beach. Similarly, the existence of a 
Park District in the absence of MonDog would deprive participants 
of critical public services. Thus, the presence of institutional di-
versity at Montrose provides participants with a more robust and 
effective governance structure.
The role of the police officer within this SES is slightly more puz-
zling. Of the Park’s 255 reviews, only one man mentioned the po-
lice at all, and even he merely wished to gripe over their seeming 
lack of a presence in the park: speaking of a recent altercation, he 
wrote that “the police were called 10-12 times and he got away.” 
There are two plausible interpretations of this phenomenon. For 
one, it could be that the perceived threat of an overarching entity 
with legal and monetary sanctioning powers serves to proactively 
deter infractions. In game theoretic terms, this is to say that the 
police serve as a “credible threat” whose mere presence (or the per-
ception of their presence) coerces participants into compliance. On 
the other hand, it is possible that the police do, in fact, maintain an 
active function at the beach, but affected parties are – for whatev-
er reason – systematically under-represented in the online reviews. 
This distinction is important but one that is admittedly difficult to 
parse out. Regardless, it stands that the Chicago police force rep-
resents one layer of the self-governing, institutionally diverse SES 
at Montrose.
SECTION VII: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Frequenters of Montrose generally agree that the park is clean, 
well-run, and a little crowded but an overall pleasant experience 
for both dogs and their owners. Though violations of the existing 
rules do occur, none pose an existential threat to the order, mainte-
nance, and sustainability of the system. With high degrees of social 
capital between participants, the reality of repeated interactions, the 
existence of entwined utilities, and the institutional diversity of a 
polycentric system, Montrose Dog Beach is a positively complex, 
dynamic, and ultimately self-sustaining SES – as one patron put it, 
a bustling space of “beautiful chaos” (Yelp, 2018).
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